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PRESIDENTIAL LEGITIMACY THROUGH THE ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LENS
CATHERINE Y. KIM*
INTRODUCTION
The Obama administration's deferred action programs granting
temporary relief from deportation to undocumented immigrants have
focused attention to questions regarding the legitimacy of presiden-
tial lawmaking.' Days after the administration first announced it
would grant work authorization and renewable two-year reprieves
from removal to noncitizens who were brought to the United States
in childhood, 2 Republicans attacked the program as an "affront to
our system of representative government and the legislative pro-
cess." 3 When the president subsequently expanded the program to
benefit additional childhood arrivals as well as the parents of U.S.
citizens and legal permanent residents,4 reactions were even more
critical. Members of Congress accused the administration of "sus-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. I wish to thank Max
Eichner, Victor Flatt, Don Hornstein, Holning Lau, Rob Smith, Erika Wilson, and the organizers
and participants of the American Association of Law Schools symposium on "Congressional
Dysfunction and Executive Lawmaking During the Obama Administration." Tyson Leonhardt
and Preetha Suresh provided invaluable research assistance. All errors are my own.
1. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012)
(transcript at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-
immigration); Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012)
(on file at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-
who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf).
3. Letter from 20 U.S. Senators to President Barack Obama (June 19, 2012) (on file at
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/senators-question-
president%E2%80%99s-authority-issue-immigration-directive).
4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014) (transcript at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/2014/11/20/remarkspresidentaddressnationimmigr
ation); Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Indi-
viduals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file
at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memodeferredaction.pdf).
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pend[ing] the law at its whim" in "astonishing disregard for the Con-
stitution [and] the rule of law."5 These attacks were not confined to
partisan opponents. Legal scholars of varying political stripes as-
serted a violation of separation-of-powers requirements,6 while the
editorial boards of the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and
USA Today condemned what they viewed as executive overreach. 7
Both the initial deferred action program and its subsequent expan-
sion have been subjected to constitutional challenge in the federal
courts as well.8
Immigration, though, is not the only context in which the presi-
dent has exercised policymaking authority, and this Essay examines
presidential lawmaking in the anti-discrimination context. Executive
policymaking in this area presents an important point of comparison
for deferred action because like immigration, it necessarily impli-
5. Letter from 22 U.S. Senators to President Barack Obama (Apr. 24, 2014) (on file at
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/senators-press-administration-enforcing-
immigration-laws-new-%E2%80%9Cenforcement-review%E2%80%9D).
6. See Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part 11- Faithfully Executing the
Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 199, 255 (2015); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:
The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the
Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REv. 781 (2013); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and
Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014); Obama Immigration Policy: Hearing Before the
S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of John C. Eastman); The President's
Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
H. R., 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz); The President's Consti-
tutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H. R.,
113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Jonathan Turley).
7. Editorial, On Immigration, the GOP Should Make the Next Move, WASH. POST (Nov.
20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/on-immigration-the-gop-should-make-
the-next-move/2014/11/20/99cl0984-70e8-11e4-8808-afaale3a33efstory.html; Editorial, I
Barack, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2014, at A12; Editorial, Obama's Immigration Order: Right Thing
in The Wrong Way, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2014, at A8; see also Ross Douthat, The Great Be-
trayal: Commentary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014, at SR9.
8. In October of 2012, a union representing federal immigration officials filed suit alleg-
ing that the initial deferred action program "unconstitutionally usurps and encroaches upon the
legislative powers of Congress" and violates the president's constitutional duty to 'faithfully
execute the laws." Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-3247, 2012 WL 5199509 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
10, 2012). Although the district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their statutory claim, it found that the Civil Service Reform Act precluded review and
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-3247, 2013
WL 8211660 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013).
More recently, twenty-six states filed suit seeking to enjoin the expanded deferred
action program. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction,
concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the pro-
gram violates the Administrative Procedure Act's procedural and substantive requirements.
Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015). The admin-
istration has announced it will petition the Supreme Court to review the decision. Michael D.
Shear, Fate of 5 Million at Stake, Obama to Ask Justices to Rule on Immigration Overhaul,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2015, at A15.
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cates the rights of traditionally disenfranchised populations. Deferred
action benefits undocumented aliens, who by definition lack direct
political representation; anti-discrimination laws benefit other "dis-
crete and insular groups" such as racial and ethnic minorities or
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)
communities. 9 Presidential policies relating to workplace discrimina-
tion, environmental justice, and affirmative action exhibit some of the
key features animating the separation-of-powers debate over de-
ferred action yet have been spared from serious constitutional chal-
lenge.
A comparison of executive policies in the immigration and anti-
discrimination contexts identifies unique challenges to assessing the
validity of presidential attempts to protect minority populations. In
prior generations, when federal courts were the institutions most fre-
quently relied upon to protect these groups, scholars recognized the
need to develop an account of judicial legitimacy capable of explain-
ing and evaluating such judicial interventions.10 As doctrinal and po-
litical developments have diminished the role of federal courts in this
area," however, civil rights scholars have begun examining the
growing importance of the executive branch in this role.12 Yet, they
9. For discussions of the intersection between immigration and racial status, see Gabri-
el J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1998); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immi-
gration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1625 (1992); Rose Cruz Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of
Property, Race and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2010),
10. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938) (suggesting need
for heightened judicial scrutiny to review legislation targeting "discrete and insular minorities"
such as particular religious, national, or racial groups); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-79 (1980); Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
11. See e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. (2011) (involving requirements for
class certification in civil rights case); Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (determining
pleading standards in civil rights case); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (setting
forth standards for inferring private rights of action in civil rights case); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (establishing standing requirements for injunctive relief in civil
rights cases); see also Myriam Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing
Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1386 (2000);
Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183 (2003);
Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Fu-
ture of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1455-
68(2013).
12. See Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the Executive Branch
in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J.
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have not fully grappled with the unique legitimacy concerns implicat-
ed by such presidential actions. This Essay begins to fill that gap.
Part I analyzes the separation-of-powers concerns raised by the
deferred action programs and identifies parallel examples from the
anti-discrimination context. Part II contextualizes attacks on deferred
action within the broader debate over the legitimacy of presidential
lawmaking. 13 As a formal matter, the validity of an executive policy
depends on its adherence to congressional intent. 14 The delegation
of exceedingly broad swaths of discretion to the executive, however,
frequently renders congressional intent difficult to discern. In light of
this ambiguity, administrative law scholars have proposed function-
alist approaches to assessing the legitimacy of presidential exercis-
es of power, collectively focusing on four general metrics: (1) public
visibility, (2) adherence to majoritarian preferences, (3) avoidance of
factionalism, and (4) reasoned deliberation. Part Ill assesses the de-
ferred action and anti-discrimination policies along these dimen-
sions. It concludes that proposed metrics for evaluating presidential
AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 146 (2008); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney Gen-
eral: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012); Joseph Landau,
Presidential Constitutionalism and Civil Rights, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1719 (2014); Chinh W.
Le, Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 726
(2010); Margaret H. Lemos, Consequences of Congress' Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretations of Title V1l, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010); Eloise Pasachoff, Special
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413
(2011); Stephen Plass, Exploring the Limits of Executive Civil Rights Policymaking, 61 OKLA.
L. REV. 155 (2008); Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519
(2014).
13. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031
(2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 506 (2003); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Admin-
istration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEx. L. REV. 441, 448
(2010); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presiden-
tial Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1741 (2009); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 MIcH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty,
67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of
the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1387 (2013); Kevin M. Stack, The President's
Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006); Kathryn A. Watts,
Controlling Presidential Control, 119 MIcH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
14. This Essay proceeds on the assumption that presidential power over immigration is
coextensive with such power over purely domestic matters. The Constitution, however, argua-
bly vests the executive branch with greater authority to regulate immigration than matters that
do not implicate the nation's foreign relations. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The
President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (discussing presidential authority to
act unilaterally in immigration context); Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers
and the President's Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691 (2014).
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lawmaking prove indeterminate in all but the one easy case, demon-
strating the need for a distinct theory of legitimacy when the presi-
dent acts to protect vulnerable populations.
1. PRESIDENTIAL LAWMAKING IN THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
CONTEXT
This section analyzes the two features of the deferred action
policy that have drawn the most criticism. It then identifies parallel
examples from the anti-discrimination context in which the president
unilaterally imposed a policy shaping the rights of a traditionally dis-
enfranchised group. While executive policies relating to workplace
discrimination, environmental justice, and affirmative action raise
some of the same separation-of-powers concerns implicated by de-
ferred action, they have been spared from serious constitutional
challenge.
A. Deferred Action
Constitutional challenges to the deferred action policies focus
on two key aspects of the programs: their similarities to failed legis-
lation and their categorical nature. First, critics of deferred action
contend that the imposition of the programs as a direct response to
Congress' failure to enact bills proposing similar goals makes evi-
dent the programs' unconstitutionally legislative nature. In the years
preceding the announcement of the initial deferred action program in
2012, Congress repeatedly considered DREAM Act legislation that
would have normalized the immigration status of undocumented
youth who came to the United States in childhood. 15 When the bill
failed to reach a floor vote, President Obama announced the "De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" program, expressly justifying it
as a response to legislative failure.16
The subsequent expansion of the deferred action policy in 2014
similarly responded to Congress' refusal to act. After the Senate
passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill to grant.relief to mil-
lions of undocumented immigrants in June of 2013,17 the president
15. See, e.g., S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 6487, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3992,
111th Cong. (2010).
16. Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), supra note 2.
17. S. 744, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Roll No. 168, U.S. SENATE (June 27, 2013),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call_ists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?&congress=1 13&se
ssion=l&vote=00168.
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repeatedly pressed the House to act as well. 18 But when the Speak-
er of the House indicated that he would not bring the legislation to a
floor vote in his chamber that year, 19 the president responded swiftly
by announcing the expansion of the deferred action policy, again cit-
ing the need to cure Congress' failure to act.20 Opponents have cit-
ed this sequence of events as demonstrative of the president's
unconstitutional encroachment of Congress' exclusive lawmaking
authority.21
Critics have also focused on a second feature of deferred ac-
tion: the categorical nature of the programs. While the executive
branch may validly exercise prosecutorial discretion to decline to en-
force a statute in a particular case,22 opponents maintain that de-
ferred action exceeds the bounds of such authority because it
"requires no searching, individualized evaluation of the merits of par-
ticular applicants. All who possess the designated characteristics will
qualify." 23 Pursuant to this view, the failure to enforce statutory re-
18. President Barack Obama, Statement on Senate Passage of Immigration Reform
Legislation (June 27, 2013) (transcript at
http://www.readperiodicals.com/201306/3039409011.htmi); President Barack Obama, Re-
marks on Immigration Reform (Oct. 24, 2013) (transcript at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-president-obamas-oct-24-remarks-on-
immigration-reform/2013/10/24/7e322db4-3cba-1 1 e3-a94f-b58017bfee6cstory.html); Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Business Leaders to Discuss immigra-
tion Reform (Nov. 5, 2013); President Barack Obama, Statement on House of
Representatives Action on Immigration Reform Legislation (Mar. 26, 2014); President Barack
Obama, Statement on Immigration Reform Legislation (Apr. 16, 2014).
19. Steven Dennis, Immigration Bill Officially Dead: Boehner Tells Obama No Vote This
Year, President Says, ROLL CALL (June 30, 2014), http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-
house/immigration-bill-officially-dead-boehner-tells-obama-no-vote-this-year/.
20. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Border Security and Immi-
gration Reform, (June 30, 2014) (transcript at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/06/30/remarks-president-border-security-and-immigration-reform); Remarks by the
President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), supra note 4.
21. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 6, at 254 (arguing that presidential policy imposed
"after Congress voted down their antecedent bills" exceeds executive authority); Testimony of
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, supra note 6, at 4 (arguing that deferred action policy, "which
exactly mirrors a statute that Congress declined to pass," demonstrates its "distinctly legisla-
tive character").
22. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987) (discussing importance of
prosecutorial discretion in American law). The executive branch has granted deferred action to
undocumented aliens on a case-by-case basis for decades without constitutional challenge.
See Classes of Aliens Authorized to Accept Employment, 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14) (2015) (de-
fining "deferred action" as "an act of administrative convenience to the government which
gives some cases lower priority"); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 248-52 (2010) (discussing historical
evolution of deferred action).
23. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 845; see also Price, supra note 13, at 760 (con-
cluding that non-enforcement decisions pursuant to the program are invalid because they are
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quirements in a predetermined category of cases, rather than on an
individualized case-by-case basis, undermines its claim as a valid
exercise of executive branch prosecutorial discretion.
B. Parallels from the Anti-Discrimination Context
Presidential lawmaking in the anti-discrimination context shares
much in common with deferred action. First, both contexts neces-
sarily implicate the rights of traditionally disenfranchised groups.
Second, a number of presidential anti-discrimination policies exhibit
the features animating the constitutional debate over deferred ac-
tion. Executive actions relating to workplace discrimination and envi-
ronmental justice, like deferred action, responded to Congress'
refusal to legislate the policy. Presidential actions relating to affirma-
tive action, like deferred action, categorically refused to enforce
statutory requirements in a predetermined set of cases. Unlike de-
ferred action, however, these examples were spared from serious
constitutional attack.
1. Workplace Discrimination
Both the Clinton and Obama administrations engaged in presi-
dential lawmaking to protect members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender (LGBT) communities from workplace discrimina-
tion. As with deferred action, the administration in both cases re-
peatedly urged Congress to legislate protections for a minority group
and, after Congress refused to do so, acted to impose such protec-
tions unilaterally.
After the Stonewall Rebellion in 1969, the gathering momentum
of the LGBT rights movement coalesced with the introduction of the
Equality Act in the House of Representatives in 1974.24 Modeled on
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 the bill proposed to broadly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation across employment,
housing, and public accommodations. 26 The bill stalled, however,
and although Congress considered similar bills in subsequent years,
not "based on compelling individual circumstances" or "exceptional, unforeseen events justi-
fy[ing] relief from the full rigor of immigration law").
24. H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended across
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
26. H.R. 14752, supra note 24.
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a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute continued to elude
LGBT advocates.27
By the early 1990s, LGBT groups hoped to broaden public sup-
port by narrowing their focus to workplace discrimination, resulting in
the introduction of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)
in 1994.28 The bill died in committee but was reintroduced the fol-
lowing year.29 This time, it reached the Senate floor but ultimately
failed by one vote. 30 Meanwhile, debate over President Clinton's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and the enactment of the Defense of
Marriage Act ensured a prominent place for LGBT issues in the
1996 elections.31 After Bill Clinton won reelection, he continued to
press Congress to enact ENDA legislation. 32 The bill was intro-
duced again in 1997, but neither the House nor the Senate, both of
which were controlled by Republicans, reached a vote on the meas-
u re. 33
With months remaining before the 1998 mid-term elections,
President Clinton took matters into his own hands. In May of that
year, he issued Executive Order 13,087 prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in the federal workplace. 34 The presi-
dent's statement accompanying the order expressly cited Congress'
failure to enact ENDA and once again urged it to do so. 35
President Obama's order on workplace discrimination followed
a similar course. After 1998, legislation to prohibit sexual-orientation
discrimination across all workplaces, not just federal employers,
27. See, e.g., H.R. 447, 94th Cong. (1975).
28. H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994); S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994).
29. S. 2056,104th Cong. (1995).
30. S.2056, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996); Roll No. 281, U.S. SENATE (Sept. 10, 1996),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll1call_1ists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?congress=104&ses
sion=2&vote=00281.
31. See, e.g., Presidential Debate Between Republican Nominee Senator Bob Dole and
President Bill Clinton, San Diego, Cal. (Oct. 16, 1996) (transcript at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulwslindex.php?pid=52115&st=gay&stl =).
32. Letter from President William J. Clinton, to Edward Kennedy, Senator, Mass. (Oct.
19, 1995); President William J. Clinton, Statement on Proposed Employment Non-
Discrimination Legislation (Apr. 24, 1997) (transcript at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=54041).
33. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1858,
105th Cong. (1997); see also Joyce Price, Activists Shun Hearings on Hill: But Fight 'Gay Bill'
Behind the Scenes, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997.
34. Exec. Order No. 13087-Further Amendment to Executive Order 11478, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity in the Federal Government, 3 C.F.R. § 13087 (1998).
35. President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing an Executive Order on Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity in the Federal Government (May 28, 1998) (transcript at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56040).
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continued to be introduced in Congress but was defeated each
time. 36 In 2007, the House passed a version of ENDA, 37 but the bill
did not reach the Senate. Once President Obama came into office,
he repeatedly pressed Congress to enact legislation on the issue.38
In 2013, the Senate passed a broader version of ENDA protecting
gender identity as well sexual orientation, 39 but the bill did not reach
a House vote.4 0
Again, just months before the mid-term elections, President
Obama acted unilaterally. On July 21, 2014, he issued Executive
Order 13,67241 which expanded the Clinton order in two ways. First,
it added gender identity to the list of protected categories.42 Second,
it applied to federal contractors as well as federal employers, ex-
tending protections to roughly a fifth of the national workforce.43 And
again, the president's statement accompanying the order expressly
justified it as a cure to legislative inaction: "Now, Congress has
spent 40 years-four decades-considering legislation that would
36. Every Congress after 1998 except the 109th (2005-2006) has considered a version
of ENDA legislation. See, e.g., H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999); S.1276, 106th Cong. (1999);
H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1284 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (2003);
S. 1705, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2981, 111th Cong. (2009);
S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011); S.811, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.
1755, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
37. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007); Roll No. 1057, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Nov. 7, 2007), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/rolI1057.xml.
38. See President Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
and Transgender Pride Month (May 28, 2010) (transcript at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/presidential-proclamation-lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgender-pride-month);
President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Human Rights Campaign's Annual National Dinner
(Oct. 1, 2011) (transcript at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 1/10/01/remarks-
president-human-rights-campaigns-annual-national-dinner); President Barack Obama, State-
ment on Senate Passage of Legislation To Prevent Employment Discrimination Against Les-
bian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons (Nov. 7, 2013) (transcript at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201300762/pdf/DCPD-201300762.pdf).
39. S. 815, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Roll No. 232, U.S. SENATE (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-calllists/rollcallvotecfm.cfm?&congress=1 13&se
ssion=1&vote=00232.
40. H.R. Res. 678, 113th Cong. (2013).
41. Exec. Order No. 13672-Further Amendments to Execute Order 11478, Equal Op-
portunity in the Federal Government, and Executive Order 11246, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 23, 2014). For a broader discussion of President Obama's
policies to enhance equality for LGBT individuals, see Landau, supra note 12, at 1755-65.
42. Exec. Order No. 13672, supra note 41.
43. Id.; President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Executive Or-
der on LGBT Workplace Discrimination (July 21, 2014) (transcript at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/21/remarks-president-signing-executive-
order-Igbt-workplace-discrimination); Jennifer Bendery, Obama Signs Executive Order on
LGBT Job Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2014, 3:59 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/obama-gay-rights-n_5605482.html.
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help solve the problem. That's a long time. And yet they still haven't
gotten it down . . . I'm going to do what I can, with the authority I
have, to act." 4 4 In both situations, Presidents Clinton and Obama
urged Congress to enact a particular legislative policy, and when
Congress failed to do so, unilaterally imposed a program to achieve
their goals.
2. Environmental Justice
The Clinton administration also engaged in presidential lawmak-
ing in environmental justice, mandating the mitigation of racial dis-
parities in the distribution of environmental harms. In the early
1990s, activists began drawing attention to the disproportionate en-
vironmental hazards imposed on communities of color, launching
the environmental justice movement. Then-Senator Al Gore intro-
duced the Environmental Justice Act of 1992 to curtail adverse envi-
ronmental impacts on minority groups, among other goals.45 That
bill was ultimately defeated, and after a similar bill failed the follow-
ing year, 46 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898 in Feb-
ruary of 1994.47 Like the bills considered and rejected by Congress,
the order, titled "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations," required
agencies to "identify[] and address[] . . . disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects of [federal] pro-
grams, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-
income populations in the United States."48 Once again, members of
the administration championed a bill before Congress; Congress de-
feated the bill; and then the president unilaterally imposed a pro-
gram to achieve the goals of the failed bill.
3. Affirmative Action
The last example of presidential lawmaking involves affirmative
action. Like deferred action, this policy constituted a categorical re-
fusal to enforce statutory provisions in a predetermined set of cases.
44. Remarks by the President at Signing of Executive Order on LGBT Workplace Dis-
crimination (July 21, 2014), supra note 43.
45. S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992); see also H.R. 5326, 102d Cong. (1992).
46. S. 1161, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993).
47. Exec. Order No. 12898-Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minori-
ty Populations and Low-Income Populations, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995).
48. Id.
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During the 2000 presidential race, George W. Bush actively cam-
paigned on an anti-affirmative action platform. 49 Once in office, his
administration remained faithful to this stance, arguing before the
Supreme Court in the Grutter and Gratz cases that university race-
conscious admissions policies violated constitutional equal protec-
tion guarantees.50 Less apparent at least initially, the Bush admin-
istration also pursued its policy against affirmative action through the
use of signing statements.
The president's statement upon signing the Export-Import Bank
Reauthorization Act of 200251 is illustrative, providing that "The ex-
ecutive branch shall carry out section 7(b) of the bill, which relates to
certain small businesses, in a manner consistent with the require-
ments of equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution." 52 While this statement omits ex-
press mention of affirmative action, section 7(b) in fact requires
"special emphasis on conducting outreach and increasing loans" for
small businesses owned by "socially and economically disadvan-
taged" groups, defined to include "Black Americans, Hispanic Amer-
icans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other
minorities." 53 A careful parsing of the statutory text thus reveals a re-
fusal to enforce the statute's affirmative action requirements to the
extent they conflict with the White House's interpretation of constitu-
tional guarantees. According to political scientist Philip Cooper,
49. The Republican Party Platform for the 2000 election stated 'We believe rights inhere
in individuals, not in groups. We will attain our nation's goal of equal opportunity without quo-
tas or other forms of preferential treatment." Republican Party Platform of 2000, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 31, 2000), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849. In an
interview with Time Magazine, Bush famously stated: "The best thing to do is to educate every
child and to challenge the soft bigotry of low expectations. We can have affirmative programs
that enhance people's chance to access the middle class without quotas and without pitting
race against race.... I call it affirmative access.... And yes, racism exists. I'm not going to be
making policy based on guilt." Interview by Walter Isaacson, Time Magazine, with President
George W. Bush (Aug. 1, 2000).
50. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Grutter v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
51. Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-189, 116 Stat. 701
(2002) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 635 (2012)).
52. President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Export-Import Reauthorization
Act of 2002 (June 14, 2002) (transcript at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=62993).
53. Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002 § 7(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
635(b)(1)(E)(iii)(II) (defining "socially and economically disadvantaged small business con-
cerns" by reference to 15 U.S.C. §637(a)(4), which refers to businesses owned by "Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minor-
ities," 5 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)).
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President Bush utilized signing statements with similar language to
oppose affirmative action provisions no fewer than fifteen times dur-
ing his first term in office.5 4
The affirmative action policy exhibits the second feature trou-
bling critics of deferred action: a categorical refusal to enforce statu-
tory provisions in a predetermined set of cases. It is true that
executive nonenforcement of affirmative action was based on consti-
tutional objections, while the refusal to deport certain classes of un-
documented immigrants was based solely on notions of fairness or
good policy.55 It is not at all clear, though, that a president's conclu-
sion that a statute is inconsistent with the Constitution justifies his or
her refusal to enforce it.56 Moreover, even those who endorse such
presidential authority might be wary of sanctioning its exercise
where the constitutional objections to the statute are not identified
and articulated.
The affirmative action example diverges from the pattern identi-
fied in the preceding situations in one important respect. In the other
cases, the executive responded to Congress' refusal to enact a bill,
suggesting a violation of congressional intent to the extent a failure
54. Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allen Poe, and the Use and Abuse of
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 525 (2005). George W.
Bush's relatively covert use of signing statements to oppose affirmative action requirements
contrasts starkly with his father's. President George H.W. Bush signed the veto-proof Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which made clear that employment policies having a disparate impact on
minority groups violated the Act. In doing so, he issued a signing statement setting forth his
administration's legal view of the constitutional restrictions on disparate impact and stating that
the administration would interpret the statute to adhere to its interpretation. President George
H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1504 (Nov. 21,
1991). For a discussion of the anti-affirmative action policies promulgated under the Reagan
and H.W. Bush administrations, see Landau, supra note 12, at 1742-43.
55. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 6, at 836-41; Testimony of Jonathan Turley, supra
note 6, at 18-19.
56. Compare Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., to The Honora-
ble Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Un-
constitutional Statutes 200-03 (Nov. 2, 1994) (on file at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olcll0294.html) and Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assis-
tant Att'y Gen., for the Counsel to the President, The Legal Significance of Presidential Sign-
ing Statements 131 (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olclopinions/1993/11/31/op-olc-vOl 7-p0131.pdf) and
Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMM. 307 (2006) with Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive
Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006) (arguing that presidential refusal to enforce statute
on constitutional grounds should be limited to issues involving statutory ambiguity) and
Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 81 (2007).
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to legislate reflects opposition to a policy choice. 57 In the affirmative
action example, by contrast, the executive policy responded to a
positive legislative enactment, seeking to nullify the clear intent of
Congress. In this way, the affirmative action policy signifies a more
intrusive encroachment on legislative authority.
Presidential lawmaking in anti-discrimination raises some of the
same constitutional concerns associated with deferred action. Exec-
utive branch policies prohibiting workplace discrimination on the ba-
sis of LGBT status and requiring the mitigation of racial disparities in
environmental harms share much in common with deferred action.
In each of these cases, members of the administration urged Con-
gress to legislate a particular policy goal; Congress refused to do so;
and, in response, the president imposed the policy unilaterally. The
affirmative action policy does not follow this pattern, but shares an-
other feature with deferred action: both constitute a categorical re-
fusal to enforce statutory provisions. The purpose here is not to
argue that these examples are identical in every respect. Nonethe-
less, they share one crucial feature-they each involve the interests
of vulnerable groups and thus present particular legitimacy chal-
lenges.
II. METRICS FOR ASSESSING THE LEGITIMACY OF PRESIDENTIAL
LAWMAKING
In important ways, the constitutional debate over deferred ac-
tion replicates the debate over the legitimacy of "presidential admin-
istration" more generally. The first feature troubling critics of deferred
action-the president's attempt to cure legislative inaction-
expresses a concern of presidential intrusion on Congress' exclusive
lawmaking authority. By contrast, the second feature-the categori-
cal nature of a policy-invokes concerns of presidential interference
in technocratic decisionmaking made by bureaucratic expertise.,,
57. But see United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Cent. Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) ("'[C]ongressional inaction
lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from
such inaction.")); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969) (quoting Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness,
preoccupation, or paralysis. 'It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the
adoption of a controlling rule of law.")).
58. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1929 (2015) ("Precluding prospective and categorical articulation of immigration enforcement
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Administrative law scholars have addressed these concerns directly,
proposing two approaches to distinguish between permissible and
impermissible exercises of presidential authority: the political ac-
countability model and the good governance model. Taken together,
these models suggest four general metrics for assessing the legiti-
macy of presidential action: political visibility; adherence to majoritar-
ian preferences; avoidance of factionalism; and reasoned
deliberation.
A. Political Accountability
The dominant approach to assessing the legitimacy of presiden-
tial lawmaking focuses on the extent to which it is politically ac-
countable. The president arguably enjoys more democratic
legitimacy than civil servants or even Congress because only the
president answers to the national electorate.59 The degree to which
a given presidential policy can be said to be politically accountable,
however, varies along two discrete but related measures.
The first dimension of political accountability involves visibility.60
The public cannot hold the president accountable for a decision un-
less it is made aware of the decision. In the words of one commen-
tator, this factor "allows concerned parties-both public and
political-to understand governmental decisions, to detect improper
motives, and to assign blame." 6 1 Although scholars frequently refer
to "transparency" norms, the term "visibility" better captures the con-
cept. Transparency in the sense of public disclosure does not,
standing alone, ensure public understanding of a policy or a mecha-
nism to express disapproval; a degree of public salience is also
necessary. As many have noted, the intense media scrutiny of the
Oval Office renders presidential decisions more visible than individ-
ual enforcement decisions made by street-level agency officials or
legislative decisions made by Congress. 62 Nonetheless, the presi-
policy and priorities is tantamount to insisting that nonenforcement decisions be made by low-
er-level officials..."); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 13; Watts, supra note 13.
59. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2333-37.
60. Id. at 2337 ("It is when presidential control of administrative action is most visible that
it most will reflect presidential reliance on and responsiveness to broad public sentiment").
61. Bressman, supra note 13, at 506.
62. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2310.
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dent sometimes employs more covert methods to achieve policy
goals, and, in doing so, compromises democratic legitimacy.63
A second and related dimension of political accountability is
consistency with majoritarian preferences. A unilateral action op-
posed by the general public has little claim to democratic legitimacy.
Again, presidential policies generally fare better along this measure
than decisions made by civil servants or Congress because the
president, unlike those other institutions, answers directly to the na-
tional electorateA^ Yet it is easy to imagine a president bowing to
the preferences of campaign donors rather than those of the public
at large, particularly where he or she can evade public scrutiny in
doing so. In this way, adherence to public preferences often corre-
sponds closely with visibility.
B. Good Governance
An alternative "good governance" approach focuses on a
broader constellation of norms beyond political accountability to as-
sess the legitimacy of presidential lawmaking. 65 One of the leading
proponents of this approach defines legitimacy in terms of an avoid-
ance of arbitrariness, which in turn is described as follows:
At a basic level, arbitrary administrative decisionmaking is not ra-
tional, predictable, or fair. More helpfully, it generates conclusions
that do not follow logically from the evidence, rules that give no
notice of their application, or distinctions that violate basic princi-
ples of equal treatment. Importantly, it also may affect individual
rights in the absence of an adequate justification - that is, in the
absence of reasons reflecting some sufficiently public purpose. 66
Another commentator defines executive legitimacy in terms of "six
core principles: purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, rea-
sonableness, and transparency." 67 For present purposes, these var-
ious factors may be grouped into two general categories: the
avoidance of factionalism and the requirement for reasoned deliber-
ation.
One of the central measures of legitimacy pursuant to the good
governance approach is the avoidance of factionalism that would
63. Kitrosser, supra note 13, at 1744; Mendelson, supra note 13, at 1130; Watts, supra
note 13, at 6.
64. Kagan, supra note 13, at 2335.
65. See Bressman, supra note 13, at 497.
66. Id. at 496.
67. Criddle, supra note 13, at 448.
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compromise the public interest. This factor addresses "the potential
for narrowly focused groups to influence governmental decisionmak-
ing at public expense." 68 The avoidance of factionalism often over-
laps with democratic accountability goals, to the extent that both
reject political domination by a small, concentrated, and well-
organized group at the expense of the general public. Importantly,
however, the avoidance of factionalism sometimes departs from ma-
joritarian preferences. 69 A majority of the public may, for example,
favor oppressing a politically powerless group to advance their own
interests.70 Good governance norms deem such discrimination as
inconsistent with the common good regardless of its responsiveness
to majoritarian preferences.
The good governance approach identifies a second factor nec-
essary to legitimate government decisionmaking: a deliberative pro-
cess culminating in a reasoned explanation for a policy choice.71
This norm requires the decisionmaker to employ logic to rationalize
and defend his or her decision. Deliberation ensures knowledgeable
and reasoned decisions, thereby promoting technocratic goals of ef-
ficient and effective governance. 72
Collectively, scholarship debating the legitimacy of presidential
policies directs attention to (1) the visibility of the decision, (2) the
extent to which it reflects majoritarian preferences, (3) its avoidance
of factionalism, and (4) reasoned deliberation. The next section ap-
plies these metrics to assess the presidential policies described in
Part I, exploring the unique challenges to evaluating policies impact-
ing historically disenfranchised groups.
Ill. ASSESSING LEGITIMACY IN THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT
This section evaluates presidential lawmaking in the immigra-
tion and anti-discrimination contexts along the following four
measures of legitimacy: visibility, adherence to majoritarian prefer-
68. Bressman, supra note 13, at 498.
69. See Criddle, supra note 13, at 471.
70. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 57 (arguing that "the distribution of resources or op-
portunities to one group rather than another solely because those benefited have exercised
the raw power to obtain government assistance" enjoys no claim to legitimacy); Bressman,
supra note 13, at 504.
71. Bressman, supra note 13, at 500-01; Criddle, supra note 13, at 448; Sunstein, supra
note 10, at 57.
72. See Seidenfeld, supra note 13, at 1426.
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ences, avoidance of factionalism, and reasoned deliberation. The
indeterminacy of these metrics in all but the one easy case exposes
the need for greater attention to the unique legitimacy concerns im-
plicated by presidential actions seeking to protect vulnerable popula-
tions.
A. VISIBILITY
Any claim that a presidential policy is democratically legitimate
depends on public awareness of the policy, or visibility. By this met-
ric, President Bush's affirmative action policy is the hardest to justify
among the examples discussed here. Concededly, the policy of not
enforcing preferential treatment requirements was visible in that it
was publicly disclosed through a signing statement, and the presi-
dent was clearly identified as the decisionmaker responsible for the
policy. As such, it is more politically accountable than policies over
which the president can disclaim ownership. Nonetheless, the sign-
ing statements were transparent only in a superficial sense. Alt-
hough the administration announced its policy of nonenforcement in
over a dozen statements from 2001 to 2005, the policy escaped
public notice until 2006, when the Boston Globe published an exten-
sive review of the practice. 73 It was only then that the policy became
subject to public scrutiny and criticism. 74 In the interim, the lack of
public awareness precluded the exercise of any meaningful electoral
check.
The other examples present a more complicated picture, sug-
gesting an inverse relationship between visibility and political con-
sensus. The public awareness necessary to trigger meaningful
electoral checks depends largely on media coverage, and media
coverage depends largely on the existence of debate and dissent.
The media extensively covered political opposition to both the de-
73. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, Bos. GLOBE (Apr. 30, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/04/30/bush-challenges-hundre
ds-of-laws/.
74. After publication of the Boston Globe article, public criticism was immediate and pro-
nounced. The American Bar Association convened a task force on the use of signing state-
ments, which concluded, "[t]o sign a bill and refuse to enforce some of its provisions because
of constitutional qualms is tantamount to exercising the line-item veto power held unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. New York." NEAL R. SONNETT, AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK
FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE,
RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT 22 (Aug. 2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/20
060823144113.authcheckdam.pdf.
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ferred action policy75 as well as the Clinton workplace discrimination
order,76 ultimately triggering direct electoral checks in the form of
congressional votes on whether to repeal the policy in each in-
stance.7  The notable absence of political opposition to the Clinton
environmental justice order75 and the Obama workplace discrimina-
tion order,79 by contrast, resulted in far less media attention to these
75. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
76. Joyce Howard Price, Clinton Order Hit as Awarding Gays 'Special Pnvileges, WASH.
TIMES, May 30, 1998 (discussing political criticism of order); Jim Kirskey, Hefley Upset by Or-
der; Job Bias Protection at Heart of Problem, DENVER POST, June 25, 1998, at B-04 (same).
77. The House of Representatives ultimately voted 176-252 against denying federal
funds for the enforcement of the Clinton workplace discrimination order. H.R. 4276, 105th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1998) amended by H. Amend. 855, Hefley Amend. (1998) [hereinafter Hefley
Amendment]; Roll No. 398, J. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ¶[ 82.28 (Aug. 5, 1998),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HJOURNAL-1 998/pdf/HJOURNAL-1 998-08-05-para82-28.pdf.
The House voted in favor of denying funds for the initial deferred action program for
childhood arrivals. To Prohibit Certain Actions with Respect to Deferred Action for Aliens Not
Lawfully Present in the United States, and for Other Purposes, H.R. 5272, 113th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2014); Roll Call No. 479, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll479.xml. The following year, it voted in favor of denying
federal funding to the expanded deferred action program in two separate measures. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, H.R. 240, 114th Cong. (2015), amended by H.
Amends. 6 & 7, Aderholt Amend. & Blackburn Amend. (2015) [hereinafter Aderholt & Black-
burn Amendments]; Roll No. 29, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll029.xml; Roll No. 30, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Jan. 14, 2015), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll030.xml. The Senate version of the bill
was defeated by filibuster. Immigration Rule of Law Act of 2015, S. 534, 114th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2015); Roll No. 63, U.S. SENATE (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LlS/roll-calIlists/roll callIvote_cfm.cfm?congress=1 14&ses
sion=1&vote=00063.
78. Journalistic coverage of the Clinton environmental justice order mentioned virtually no
political opposition to the policy. See, e.g., John Cushman, Jr., Clinton to Order Pollution Poli-
cy Cleared of Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/1 0/us/clinton-to-order-pollution-policy-cleared-of-bias.html;
Gary Lee, Clinton Executive Order Gives Boost to Mission, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 1994),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1 994/02/17/clinton-executive-order-gives-
boost-to-mission/7a00e599-8db2-4ad4-8245-8eee3ba4e06al; Timothy Noah, Order to be Is-
sued on Agencies' Effect on Pollution in Minority Communities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1994.
The Wall Street Journal published a single guest editorial criticizing the order by law professor
David Schoenbroad, who argued that racial disparities in exposure to environmental hazards
might be the result of market forces rather than intentional discrimination. David Schoenbrod,
Rule of Law: Environmental "Injustice" is About Politics, Not Racism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
1994.
79. Media coverage of the Obama workplace discrimination order similarly mentioned
little political criticism. See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, Obama Moves to Protect LGBT Federal
Contractors and Employees, WASH. POST (July 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/07/21/obama-moves-to-protect-
lgbt-federal-contractors-and-employees/; Laura Meckler, Contractors Face Obama Ban
Against LGBT Bias, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2014, at A4; Beth Reinhard, A Move to Unite Tea
Paty, Social Conservatives, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2014, at A6 ("This week, Republican offi-
cials were quiet when President Barack Obama issued an executive order barring federal con-
tractors from antigay discrimination.").
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issues, thereby weakening the electorate's ability to express ap-
proval or disapproval over the president's policies.
B. Majoritarian Preferences
A second important measure of democratic legitimacy is the ex-
tent to which a policy reflects majoritarian preferences. The affirma-
tive action policy may be the hardest to justify on this measure as
well. According to a Gallup poll conducted during President Bush's
first term in office, nearly two-thirds of Americans preferred to see an
increase in affirmative action policies or have them remain the
same, while a little over a quarter wanted to see a reduction in such
programs, suggesting that a majority of the electorate did not sup-
port the president's policy. 80
The remaining examples expose more fundamental tensions
within this measure. In its simplest form, this factor could be read to
validate any presidential policy that is supported by more than half of
the electorate. Yet the existence of significant opposition, even if
not representative of a majority of the electorate, compromises a
policy's claim to democratic legitimacy. Although polls indicated a
wide majority of Americans supported President Clinton's workplace
discrimination policy, with eighty-three percent of Americans favor-
ing legal protections for lesbians and gays in the workplace,81 one
hundred and seventy-six members of the House voted to deny fed-
eral funding for the policy.82 Similarly, while sixty-three percent of
Americans supported the initial deferred action program in 201283
and sixty-two percent supported the goals of its subsequent expan-
80. Jack Ludwig, Public Warming to Affirmative Action as Supreme Court Hears Michi-
gan Case, GALLUP (Apr. 1, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/8092/public-warming-affirmative-
action-supreme-court-hears-michigan-case.aspx. Forty-nine percent of Americans, however,
felt that the federal government should not make any special efforts to help minorities, while
forty percent felt it should make every effort to do so. Public Split on Federal Role in Affirma-
tive Action, GALLUP (May 6, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/8347/Public-Split-Federal-Role-
Affirmative-
Action.aspx?g-source=affirmative%20action&g-medium=search&g.campaign=tiles.
81. Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-
rights.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
82. Hefley Amendment, supra note 77.
83. July 2012 Religion & Politics Survey, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE
PRESS (July 9, 2012),
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-questionnaires/7-12-
12%2OPolitical%2Otopline%20for%20release.pdf.
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sion,84 a full majority of the House voted to deny funding for both de-
ferred action programs.85 Indeed, Congress came perilously close to
shutting down the Department of Homeland Security altogether as a
result of opposition to deferred action.86 The vigor of this opposition
weakens these policies' claim to democratic legitimacy.
The Clinton environmental justice order suggests a final difficul-
ty in relying on majoritarian preferences to validate presidential poli-
cies. There was no public opinion data indicating either support or
opposition to the goal of mitigating racial disparities in the distribu-
tion of environmental harms. On the one hand, this evidence might
be viewed as demonstrating an absence of public opposition to the
policy, bolstering its claim to legitimacy. On the other hand, it sug-
gests public disinterest, in which case the president's devotion of re-
sources to the issue could be viewed as departing from majoritarian
priorities.
C. Factionalism
To the extent that catering to factional interests compromises
legitimacy, each of the policies described here might be viewed with
suspicion. Immigration and anti-discrimination policies by their na-
ture serve identifiable factions, whether defined by immigration sta-
tus; race or ethnicity; sexual orientation or gender identity; handicap
status; gender; etc. Indeed, critics characterized President Clinton's
workplace discrimination policy as little more than rank factionalism.
Describing the executive order protecting gays and lesbians, House
Majority Leader Dick Armey stated, "Once again, this administration
pushes extreme policies on behalf of a narrow special interest
group." 87 Similarly, opponents of deferred action accused President
Obama of pandering to the Latino vote, making special note that the
announcement of the initial program was timed only months before
the presidential elections.88
84. Sarah Dutton et al., Americans' View of the Economy Most Positive in Eight Years,
CBS NEws (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-view-of-the-economy-
most-positive-in-eight-years/.
85. Aderholt & Blackburn Amendments, supra note 77.
86. See Sean Sullivan, House Passes Bill Fully Funding Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-passes-bill-
fully-funding-the-department-of-homeland-security/2015/03/03/9d62484a-clc5-11e4-9ec2-
b418f57a4a99_story.html.
87. Price, supra note 76, at 2.
88. See, e.g., Joel Rose, For Undocumented Youth, New Policy Carries Risks, NPR
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/15/158872445/for-undocumented-youth-new-
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D. Deliberation
Careful deliberation culminating in a reasoned explanation for a
policy choice presents a final factor to consider. By this measure,
the affirmative action policy again falls short. The signing state-
ments raise vague constitutional objections to provisions requiring
preferential treatment for minorities, but omit any explanation of their
reasoning.
Yet it is not clear that the remaining examples of presidential
lawmaking fare much better. President Obama explained his justifi-
cation for the initial deferred action program as follows: "not only be-
cause it's the right thing to do for our economy-and CEOs agree
with me-not just because it's the right thing to do for our security,
but because it's the right thing to do, period." 9 President Clinton's
explanation of the need for the environmental justice order was even
vaguer, simply stating that "All Americans have a right to be protect-
ed from pollution-not just those who can afford to live in the clean-
est, safest communities." 90
The factors associated with presidential legitimacy-visibility,
adherence to majoritarian preferences, avoidance of factionalism,
and reasoned deliberation-consistently identify the Bush affirmative
action policy as suspect. This policy of nonenforcement went unno-
ticed by the public for years, was supported by less than half of the
electorate, and was accompanied by no reasoning or explanation.
Additionally, to the extent opponents of affirmative action fall into a
policy-carries-risks (stating that opponents criticized deferred action as "pandering to Latino
voters in an election year"); Television Interview by Greta Van Susteran, Fox News, with Ron
Fournier, Nat'I Journal Reporter (Nov. 19, 2014) (video at
http://dailycaller.com/2014/11/19/ron-fournier-on-executive-amnesty-a-lot-of-hispanics-see-
this-as-pandering-videol) (suggesting that Latino voters would see through the immigration
policy as mere pandering and realize they were being used politically); Jessica Chasmar,
Chris Matthews to Obama: Stop Pandering to Ethnic Groups, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2014/oct/9/chris-matthews-to-obama-stop-pandering-
to-ethnic-g/; Ian Reifowitz, GOP Says Obama Pushes Popular Immigration Policies to Win
Votes. Er, That's Called Democracy, DAILY Kos (Nov. 23, 2014),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/11/23/1346270/-GOP-says-Obama-pushes-popular-
immigration-policies-to-win-votes-Er-that-s-called-democracy# (citing elected officials who
characterized deferred action "pandering" for votes).
89. Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), supra note 2.
90. See President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing an Executive Order on Equal
Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government (May 28, 1998) (transcript at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56040).
227
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
discrete and identifiable group, the policy may be viewed as catering
to factional interests, albeit a faction that may include a majority of
the populace.
Apart from such easy cases, however, the legitimating factors
prove indeterminate in assessing protections for minority groups. In
terms of accountability, the existence of strong political opposition to
a policy compromises democratic legitimacy. Yet the absence of
such opposition minimizes media attention, thereby shielding the
policy from public scrutiny and debate and denying the public a
meaningful opportunity to exercise electoral checks. In both the Clin-
ton workplace discrimination and deferred action examples, it was
the strong political opposition to these policies that ultimately gener-
ated a direct congressional vote. The apparent political consensus
around the Clinton environmental justice order and the Obama
workplace discrimination order, by contrast, ensured the absence of
these issues on the legislative agenda and weakened the elec-
torate's ability to express approval or disapproval of them through
voting mechanisms.
The factors associated with good governance are comparably
ambiguous. As noted above, immigration and anti-discrimination pol-
icies inherently implicate factional interests. The deliberation re-
quirement often ameliorates this difficulty because the provision of a
reasoned explanation reduces the likelihood that the policy mechan-
ically responds to factional interests rather than engaging in a con-
sidered assessment of the common good. Reason-giving may be
helpful in technical areas where the common good is defined by ob-
jective measures of effectiveness or efficiency, but it provides little
protection in the context of immigration and anti-discrimination poli-
cies, which are expressly normative and ultimately can only be justi-
fied by disputed norms of fairness or morality. Absent any extrinsic
measure of the "common good" in these contexts, we lack a theoret-
ical foundation to determine when a presidential policy protecting
minority groups simply elevates the factional interests of one group
over another's.
CONCLUSION
Concerns regarding the steady accretion of presidential power
have generated various models for assessing the legitimacy of ex-
ecutive policymaking. These models prove inconclusive, however, in
evaluating presidential policies impacting vulnerable populations.
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Just as prior generations grappled with the unique legitimacy con-
cerns raised by judicial interventions designed to protect minority in-
terests, the current era of presidential lawmaking suggests the need
for a distinct theory of legitimacy when the president acts to protect
these groups.
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